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XINJIANG

Findings

- Human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained severe, and repression increased in the past year. Authorities tightened repression amid preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, limited reports of terrorist and criminal activity, and protests among ethnic minorities.
- The Chinese government used anti-terrorism campaigns as a pretext for enforcing repressive security measures, especially among the ethnic Uyghur population, including wide-scale detentions, inspections of households, restrictions on Uyghurs' domestic and international travel, restrictions on peaceful protest, and increased controls over religious activity and religious practitioners.
- Anti-terrorism and anti-crime campaigns have resulted in the imprisonment of Uyghurs for peaceful expressions of dissent, religious practice, and other non-violent activities.
- The government also continued to strengthen policies aimed at diluting Uyghur ethnic identity and promoting assimilation. Policies in areas such as language use, development, and migration have disadvantaged local ethnic minority residents and have positioned the XUAR to undergo broad cultural and demographic shifts in coming decades.
- In the past year, the Commission also observed continuing problems in the XUAR government's treatment of civil society groups, labor policies, population planning practices, judicial capacity, and government policy toward Uyghur refugees and other individuals returned to China under the sway of China's influence in other countries.

Recommendations

- Support legislation that expands U.S. Government resources for raising awareness of human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and for protecting Uyghur culture.
- Raise concern about conditions in the XUAR to Chinese officials and stress that protecting the rights of XUAR residents is a crucial step for securing true stability in the region. Condemn the use of the global war on terror as a pretext for suppressing human rights. Call for the release of citizens imprisoned for advocating ethnic minority rights or for their personal connection to rights advocates, including: Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10 years in prison after writing a short story); Abdulghani Memetemin (sentenced in 2003 to 20 years in prison for providing information on government repression

to an overseas human rights organization); and Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim (adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, sentenced in 2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respectively, for alleged economic and “secessionist” crimes); and other prisoners mentioned in this report and the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

- Support funding for non-governmental organizations that address human rights issues in the XUAR to enable them to continue to gather information on conditions in the region and develop programs to help Uyghurs increase their capacity to defend their rights and protect their culture, language, and heritage.

- Indicate to Chinese officials that Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration are aware that Chinese authorities themselves have called for improving conditions in the XUAR judiciary. Urge officials to take steps to address problems stemming from the lack of personnel proficient in ethnic minority languages. Call on rule of law programs that operate within China to devote resources to the training of legal personnel who are able to serve the legal needs of ethnic minority communities within the XUAR.

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

INTRODUCTION

Human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) remain severe, and repression increased in the past year. As detailed by the Commission in past Annual Reports,¹ the government uses anti-terrorism campaigns as a pretext for enforcing repressive security measures and for controlling expressions of religious and ethnic identity, especially among the ethnic Uyghur population, within which it alleges the presence of separatist activity. It enforces “strike hard” anti-crime campaigns against the government-designated “three forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism to imprison Uyghurs for peaceful expressions of dissent, religious practice, and other non-violent activities. In the past year, the government used these longstanding campaigns as a springboard to increase repressive practices amid preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, reports of terrorist activity, and protests among ethnic minorities. In the past year, the government also continued to strengthen policies aimed at diluting Uyghur ethnic identity and promoting assimilation. Policies in areas such as language use, development, and migration have disadvantaged local ethnic minority residents and have positioned the XUAR to undergo broad cultural and demographic shifts in coming decades.

Government policy in the XUAR violates China’s own laws and contravenes China’s international obligations to safeguard the human rights of XUAR residents. The government has failed to implement its legally stipulated “regional ethnic autonomy” system in a manner that provides XUAR residents with meaningful control over their own affairs. Instead, authorities exert central and local government control at a level antithetical to regional autonomy.

Government policies violate the basic human rights of XUAR residents and have a disparate impact on ethnic minorities.²

ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES, ANTI-CRIME CAMPAIGNS, AND SECURITY MEASURES

The Chinese government uses anti-terrorism campaigns as a pretext for enforcing harsh security policies in the XUAR. In the past year the government used security preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, reports of terrorist activity, and protests in Tibetan areas of China and within the XUAR as platforms for advancing repressive security measures in the region. In spring 2008, the Chinese government claimed it had broken up three terrorist plots to disrupt the Olympics, as well as an attempted terrorist attack on an aircraft. As in the past,³ however, the government provided scant evidence to back up its claims and continued to enforce restrictions on free press that hindered efforts to report on the region.⁴ During the same period, local governments implemented a series of measures to tighten security, restrict religious activity, and hinder citizen activism.⁵ In March 2008, authorities in Hoten district suppressed demonstrations by Uyghurs calling for human rights and detained protesters.⁶ The government continued to implement repressive security measures throughout the summer, during which time the Olympic torch passed through the XUAR in June⁷ and as the government provided limited reports of terrorist and criminal activity in the region in August.⁸ Measures reported by Chinese government sources or overseas observers included wide-scale detentions, inspections of households, restrictions on Uyghurs' domestic and international travel, controls over Uyghur Web sites, and increased surveillance over XUAR religious personnel, mosques, and religious practitioners, as well as increased monitoring of other populations.⁹ [For more information, see box titled Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics below.] Authorities in cities outside of the XUAR also increased controls over Uyghur residents leading up to and during the Olympics.¹⁰ In the aftermath of the Olympics, XUAR chair Nur Bekri outlined increased measures to "strike hard" against perceived threats in the region, casting blame on U.S.-based Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer and "western hostile forces."¹¹ Local governments and other authorities reported carrying out propaganda education campaigns, and in September, XUAR Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan described plans to launch region-wide anti-separatism education later in the year.¹²

"Strike hard" anti-crime campaigns in the region have resulted in high rates of incarceration of Uyghurs in the XUAR.¹³ Statistics from official Chinese sources indicate that cases of endangering state security from the region account for a significant percentage of the nationwide total, in some years possibly comprising most of the cases in China.¹⁴ In 2007, the head of the Xinjiang High People's Court said that the region bears an "extremely strenuous" caseload for crimes involving endangering state security.¹⁵ In August 2008, Chinese media reported that XUAR courts would "regard ensuring [state] security and social stability [as] their primary task."¹⁶

Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics

Officials in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) reiterated a pledge in August 2008 to use harsh security measures to crack down against the government-designated “three forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.¹⁷ On August 13, Wang Lequan, XUAR Communist Party Chair, described the battle against the “three forces” as a “life or death struggle” and pledged to “strike hard” against their activities. XUAR Party Committee Standing Committee member Zhu Hailun reiterated the call to “strike hard” at an August 18 meeting. The announcements followed the release of limited information on terrorist and criminal activity in the region and came amid a series of measures that increased repression in the XUAR. The measures build off of earlier campaigns to tighten repression in the region, including efforts to tighten control as the Olympic torch passed through the region in June. Reported measures implemented in the run-up to and during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games include:

- *Wide-scale Detentions.* Authorities have carried out wide-scale detentions as part of security campaigns in cities throughout the XUAR, according to a report from the Uyghur Human Rights Project. Reported measures include “security sweeps” resulting in mass detentions in the Kashgar area and Kucha county, including blanket detentions in Kucha of young people who have been abroad; the detention of non-resident Uyghurs in Korla city; the forced return of Uyghur children studying religion in another province and their detention in the XUAR for engaging in “illegal religious activities”; and the detention of family members or associates of people suspected to be involved in terrorist activity.
- *Restrictions on Uyghurs’ Domestic and International Travel.* Authorities reportedly continued to hold Uyghurs’ passports over the summer, building off of a campaign in 2007 to confiscate Muslims’ passports and prevent them from making overseas pilgrimages, according to reports from overseas media. Authorities also coupled restrictions on overseas travel with reported measures to limit Uyghurs’ travel within China.

Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics—Continued

- *Controls Over Religion.* XUAR officials have enforced a series of measures that ratchet up control over religious practice in the region, according to reports from Chinese and overseas sources. Authorities in Yéngisheher county in Kashgar district issued accountability measures on August 5 to hold local officials responsible for high-level surveillance of religious activity in the region. Also in August, authorities in Peyziwat county, Kashgar district, called for “enhancing management” of groups including religious figures as part of broader government and Party measures of “prevention” and “attack.” The previous month, authorities in Mongghulküre county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, called for strengthening management of religious affairs; inspecting all mosques and venues for religious activity; curbing “illegal” recitations of scripture and non-government-approved pilgrimages; and “penetrating” groups of religious believers to understand their ways of thinking. Authorities in Lop county, Hoten district, have been forcing women to remove head coverings in a stated effort to promote “women for the new era.” Authorities have also continued to enforce measures to restrict observance of the Muslim holiday of Ramadan, which, in 2008, took place in September.¹⁸
- *Controls Over Free Expression.* Authorities in the XUAR ordered some Uyghur Web sites to shut down their bulletin board services (BBS) during the Olympics, according to Radio Free Asia. In a review of Uyghur Web sites carried out during the Olympics, Commission staff found that BBSs on the Web sites Diyarim, Orkhun, and Alkuyi had been suspended. The BBS Web page on Diyarim contained the message, “[L]et’s protect stability with full strength and create a peaceful environment for the Olympic Games[!] Please visit other Diyarim pages[.]” The message on the BBS Web page on Orkhun stated, “Based on the requirements of the work units concerned, the Orkhun Uyghur history Web site has been closed until August 25 because of the Olympic Games.”
- *Inspections of Households in Ghulja.* Authorities in the predominantly ethnic minority city of Ghulja searched homes in the area in July in a campaign described by a Chinese official as aimed at rooting out “illegal activities” and finding residents living without proper documentation, according to Radio Free Asia.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN XINJIANG

The government imposes harsh restrictions over religious practice in the XUAR. [For detailed information, see Section II—Freedom of Religion—China’s Religious Communities—Islam.]

CONTROLS OVER FREE EXPRESSION IN XINJIANG

Authorities in the XUAR repress free speech. Authorities have levied prison sentences on individuals for forms of expression ranging from conducting historical research to writing literature. [For more information on these cases, see box titled Speaking Out: Uyghurs Punished for Free Speech in Xinjiang below.] In August 2008, Mehbube Ablesh, an employee in the advertising department

at the Xinjiang People's Radio Station was fired from her job and detained in apparent connection to her writings on the Internet that were critical of the government.¹⁹ The government engages in broad censorship of political and religious materials. In 2008, the XUAR Propaganda Bureau announced it would make "illegal" political and religious publications the focal point of its campaign to "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications."²⁰ The focus on religious and political materials builds off of earlier campaigns to root out such publications.²¹ Also in 2008, officials in Atush city reported finding "illegal" portraits of Uyghur activist Rebiya Kadeer and pictures with religious content.²² [For more information on Rebiya Kadeer, see box titled The Chinese Government Campaign Against Rebiya Kadeer below.] In addition, authorities closed some Uyghur-language Internet discussion forums during the period of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games.²³

Central and local authorities further regulate religious expression by controlling the contents of materials published by the Islamic Association of China, a Communist Party "mass organization" that, along with local branches, controls Muslim practice in China.²⁴ Authorities have detained individuals for their possession of unauthorized religious texts.²⁵

LANGUAGE POLICY AND "BILINGUAL" EDUCATION IN XINJIANG

In recent years the XUAR government has taken steps to diminish the use of ethnic minority languages in XUAR schools via "bilingual" and other educational policies that place primacy on Mandarin, such as by eliminating ethnic minority language instruction or relegating it solely to language arts classes.²⁶ The policies contravene provisions in Chinese law to protect ethnic minority languages and promote their use as regional *lingua franca*.²⁷ According to reports from official Chinese media, by 2006, the number of students receiving "bilingual" education in the XUAR had expanded 50-fold within six years.²⁸ Although the long-term impact remains unclear, sustained implementation of Mandarin-focused "bilingual" education and other language policies increases the risk that Uyghur and other ethnic minority languages are eventually reduced to cultural relics rather than actively used languages in the XUAR. [For more information on "bilingual" education, see Addendum: "Bilingual" Education in Xinjiang at the end of this section.]

Speaking Out: Uyghurs Punished for Free Speech in Xinjiang

As detailed by the Commission in past Annual Reports,²⁹ Chinese authorities have detained or imprisoned ethnic Uyghurs for various forms of peaceful expression, including non-violent dissent. Such cases include:

- Tohti Tunyaz, a Uyghur historian living in Japan whom Chinese authorities detained in 1998 while he was visiting the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to conduct research. He received an 11-year sentence in 1999 for “stealing state secrets” and “inciting splittism,” based on a list of documents he had collected from official sources during the course of his research, and on a “separatist” book he had allegedly published.³⁰
- Abduhelil Zunun, who received a 20-year sentence in November 2001 after translating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into the Uyghur language.³¹
- Abdulghani Memetemin, a journalist sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment in 2003 after providing information on government repression against Uyghurs to an overseas organization. Authorities characterized this act as “supplying state secrets to an organization outside the country.”
- Abdulla Jamal, a teacher arrested in 2005 for writing a manuscript that authorities claimed incited separatism.³²
- Nurmamet Yasin, a writer who received a 10-year sentence in 2005 for “inciting splittism” after he wrote a story about a caged bird who commits suicide rather than live without freedom.³³
- Korash Huseyin, chief editor of the journal that published Yasin’s story, who received a three-year sentence in 2005 for “dereliction of duty.” Huseyin’s sentence expired in February 2008, and he is presumed to have since been released from prison.³⁴
- Mehbube Ablesh, an employee in the advertising department at the Xinjiang People’s Radio Station, who was fired from her job in August 2008 and detained in apparent connection to her writings on the Internet that were critical of government policies, including bilingual education.³⁵

CIVIL SOCIETY IN XINJIANG

XUAR government policy hinders the growth of civil society in the region. Authorities have banned gatherings of private Islam-centered social groups, which had aimed at addressing social problems like drug use and alcoholism.³⁶ Fears of citizen activism have prompted the suppression of locally led political movements, including demonstrations in Hoten district in March led by women protesting repressive policies in the region.³⁷ Government policy in the XUAR also affects the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that aim to research conditions in the region. In July 2007, authorities in Beijing ordered the Beijing-based foreign NGO publication China Development Brief to stop publishing its Chinese-language edition and accused the English-language editor of having ties to Xinjiang “separatist” groups.³⁸ Though the charge of contact with these groups may have served as a cover for other motivations for barring the publication,³⁹ that authorities wield contact with overseas Uyghur organizations as such a pretext presents a chilling

effect on organizations that research the XUAR.⁴⁰ [For more information, see Section III—Civil Society.]

MIGRATION AND POPULATION PLANNING POLICIES IN XINJIANG

While the Commission supports Chinese government liberalizations that give citizens more choices to determine their places of residence,⁴¹ the Commission remains concerned about government policies that use economic and social benefits⁴² to channel migration to the XUAR and engineer demographic changes in the region.⁴³ The government has touted migration policies as a means to promote development and ensure “stability” and “ethnic unity.”⁴⁴ Demographic shifts have skewed employment prospects in favor of Han Chinese and funneled resources in their favor.⁴⁵ In addition, migration also has created heavy social and linguistic pressures on local ethnic minority residents.⁴⁶

The Commission also remains concerned that while the government promotes migration to the region,⁴⁷ it implements policies that target birth rates among local ethnic minority groups to reduce population increases.⁴⁸ In 2008, the government reported that the XUAR had achieved 65,000 fewer births in 2007 under policies of providing rewards to families who had fewer children than legally permitted.⁴⁹ Overseas Uyghur rights advocates have reported that authorities have carried out forced sterilizations and forced abortions to implement population planning policies.⁵⁰

The Chinese Government Campaign Against Rebiya Kadeer

The government has waged a longstanding campaign against Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer. Authorities sentenced her in 2000 to eight years in prison for “supplying state secrets or intelligence to entities outside China,” after she sent newspaper clippings to her husband in the United States. Kadeer has reported that before her release on medical parole in 2005, Chinese authorities threatened repercussions against her family members and business interests if she discussed Uyghur human rights issues in exile. Soon after Kadeer moved to the United States, authorities began a campaign of harassment against her family members remaining in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), culminating in the imprisonment of two of her sons in 2006 and 2007.⁵¹

- In May 2005, authorities detained Aysham Kerim and Ruzi Mamat, two employees at Kadeer’s trading company in the XUAR, and attempted to take her son, Ablikim Abdureyim, into detention. Authorities ransacked the company offices at the same time and confiscated documents. Authorities released Aysham Kerim and Ruzi Mamat in December 2005, after detaining them for seven months without charges.⁵²
- In August 2005, Radio Free Asia reported that authorities in the XUAR had formed a special office to monitor Kadeer’s relatives and business ties in the XUAR. Around the same time, authorities detained two of Kadeer’s relatives to pressure them to turn in their passports.⁵³

**The Chinese Government Campaign Against Rebiya Kadeer—
Continued**

- In April 2006, authorities held Kadeer's son, Alim Abdureyim, in custody and informed him that he was under suspicion for evading taxes.⁵⁴
- Authorities held Alim in custody again in late May 2006, along with his brother, Ablikim, and sister, Roshengul, and authorities later placed Alim and Ablikim in criminal detention and Roshengul under house arrest. Authorities beat Alim and Ablikim while in custody. In June, authorities took their brother Kahar into custody as well and charged him with tax evasion, Alim with tax evasion and splittism, and Ablikim with subversion of state power. Alim reportedly confessed to the charges against him after being tortured. During the same period, authorities placed Kadeer's brother under house arrest and other family members under surveillance, including grandchildren whom authorities prevented from leaving home to attend school.⁵⁵
- On November 27, 2006, an Urumqi court sentenced Alim to seven years in prison and fined him 500,000 yuan (US\$62,500) for tax evasion. The court imposed a 100,000 yuan (US\$12,500) fine on Kahar, also for tax evasion. Kadeer described the cases against her sons as a "vendetta" against her. Sources had informed her that authorities would offer leniency to her children if she refrained from participating in a November 26 election for presidency of the World Uyghur Congress.⁵⁶
- An Urumqi court sentenced Ablikim to nine years in prison and three years' deprivation of political rights on April 17, 2007, for "instigating and engaging in secessionist activities," alleging he disseminated pro-secession articles, planned to incite anti-government protest, and wrote an essay misrepresenting human rights conditions in the XUAR.⁵⁷ Both Alim and Ablikim remain in prison, where they are reported to have been tortured and abused, and where Ablikim is reported to be in poor physical health without adequate medical care.⁵⁸

DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN XINJIANG

Development policies in the XUAR have brought mixed results for ethnic minority residents. While economic reforms and development projects have raised living standards in the region,⁵⁹ they also have spurred migration,⁶⁰ strained local resources,⁶¹ and disproportionately benefited Han Chinese.⁶² Han benefit through development projects focused on Han-majority regions and development-related employment prospects that privilege Han areas and Han employees.⁶³ Development policies in the XUAR reflect tight central government control over the region⁶⁴ and are intertwined with policies to promote "social stability."⁶⁵ In the past year, the government reported on development projects directed at improving conditions for ethnic minority residents, but the overall impact remains unclear.⁶⁶

LABOR CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG

The government enforces repressive labor policies, including measures that have a disproportionate negative impact on ethnic minorities. While the Chinese government continues to fill local jobs in the XUAR with migrant labor, it also maintains programs that send young ethnic minorities to work in factories in China's interior.⁶⁷ Authorities reportedly have coerced participation and subjected workers to abusive labor practices.⁶⁸ In addition, in 2007 and 2008, overseas media reported that authorities in the XUAR continued to impose forced labor on area farmers in predominantly ethnic minority regions.⁶⁹ The XUAR government also continues to impose forced labor on local students to meet yearly harvesting quotas. In 2007, Chinese media reported that work-study programs requiring students to pick cotton have decreased in recent years, but also reported that some 1 million students picked cotton in the region that year.⁷⁰ In addition, both public and private employers continue to enforce discriminatory job hiring practices that limit job prospects for ethnic minorities.⁷¹ [For more information on labor conditions, see Addendum: Labor Conditions in Xinjiang at the end of this section.]

ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN XINJIANG

Ethnic minority residents in the XUAR face special barriers to accessing China's legal system. In addition to financial shortfalls and general personnel shortages, the XUAR judicial system lacks a sufficient number of legal personnel and translators who speak ethnic minority languages, entrenching systemic procedural irregularities into the judicial process and undercutting legal bases that guarantee the use of ethnic minority languages in judicial proceedings.⁷² [For detailed information, see Addendum: Access to Justice in Xinjiang.]

Spotlight: Uyghur Refugees and Migrants

Chinese government repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has forced some Uyghurs into exile, where, depending on their destination or transit country, they face an uncertain legal status, barriers to local asylum proceedings, and risk of refoulement to China under the sway of Chinese influence and in violation of international protections. Uyghur migrants outside the refugee and asylum-seeker population also face dangers, as China's increasing influence in neighboring countries has made Uyghur migrant communities there vulnerable to harassment and to deportation proceedings without adequate safeguards. A summary of key concerns follows:⁷³

*China's Increasing Influence*⁷⁴

- China has exerted a strong influence on neighboring countries through mechanisms including bilateral agreements and the multi-country Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Spotlight: Uyghur Refugees and Migrants—Continued

- Under the SCO, member countries agree to cooperate in anti-terrorism activities. China has been a key player in advancing cooperation and promoting campaigns that use the fight against terrorism as a pretext for repressive policies against Uyghurs both inside and outside China.

Vulnerabilities Outside China

- In some neighboring countries, Uyghurs are unable to apply for asylum locally, increasing their vulnerability as they seek other forms of protection, such as by applying for refugee status through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and resettling in a third country.⁷⁵

- In one neighboring country, Chinese influence reportedly has swayed authorities to block Uyghurs' access to local asylum proceedings, while letting asylum seekers of most other nationalities apply.

- Access to local asylum proceedings would increase the likelihood that authorities safeguard the rights of asylum seekers during the refugee status determination process. In one of China's neighboring countries, for example, extradition proceedings are suspended for individuals who seek asylum locally.

- Some countries have extradited Uyghurs with UNHCR refugee status to China, where they have faced abuse, imprisonment, and risk of execution.⁷⁶ In other cases, the UNHCR has been unable to gain access to individuals who want to initiate asylum proceedings, including some people who reportedly have been deported to China without adequate safeguards.

Violations of International Law

- The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees⁷⁷ forbids the return of refugees to "the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."

- Under the Convention Against Torture,⁷⁸ "No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."

- China violates international protections for freedom of movement⁷⁹ by denying travel documents to family members of refugees who are entitled to derivative refugee status.

ADDENDUM: "BILINGUAL" EDUCATION IN XINJIANG

In recent years the XUAR government has taken steps to diminish the use of ethnic minority languages via "bilingual" and other educational policies that place primacy on Mandarin, such as by eliminating ethnic minority language instruction or relegating it solely to language arts classes.⁸⁰ Authorities justify "bilingual" education as a way of "raising the quality" of ethnic minority students and tie knowledge of Mandarin to campaigns promoting patriotism and ethnic unity.⁸¹ XUAR Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan noted in 2005 that XUAR authorities are "resolutely deter-

mined” to promote Mandarin language use, which he found “an extremely serious political issue.”⁸² He has also stated that ethnic minority languages lack the content to express complex concepts.⁸³

XUAR language policies violate Chinese laws that protect and promote the use of ethnic minority languages, which form part of broader legal guarantees to protect ethnic minority rights and allow autonomy in ethnic minority regions. For example, Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution and Article 10 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) guarantee that ethnic minorities have “the freedom to use and develop” their languages.⁸⁴ In the area of education, Article 37 of the REAL stipulates that “[s]chools (classes) and other educational organizations recruiting mostly ethnic minority students should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the media of instruction.”⁸⁵ While educational programs that diminish the use of ethnic minority languages respond to a growing need for fluency in Mandarin to achieve educational and professional advancement, XUAR officials do not acknowledge that the need stems from official failures to implement autonomy in ethnic minority regions as provided for in Chinese law.⁸⁶

Government efforts to limit minority language use have intensified in recent years, through both “bilingual” programs and other efforts. In 2004, the XUAR government issued a directive to accelerate the development of “bilingual” education.⁸⁷ According to a 2005 Xinjiang Daily article, many “bilingual” programs have moved from offering only math and science classes in Mandarin to teaching the entire curriculum in Mandarin, except in classes devoted specifically to minority-language study.⁸⁸ In 2006, authorities in the predominantly Uyghur city of Atush announced that all first-grade elementary school classes would teach in Mandarin Chinese beginning in September 2006 and that all primary and secondary schools would be required to teach exclusively in Mandarin by 2012.⁸⁹ According to a report from official Chinese media, by 2006, the number of students receiving “bilingual” education in the XUAR had expanded 50-fold within six years.⁹⁰ According to 2007 figures reported by the Xinjiang Education Department, more than 474,500 ethnic minority students in preschool, elementary school, and secondary school programs, including vocational programs, took classes that employed “bilingual education.” According to the Xinjiang Education Department, the figure accounts for almost 20 percent of the ethnic minority student population and excludes those students studying in longstanding programs that track ethnic minority students into Mandarin Chinese schooling.⁹¹ In contrast, in 1999, experimental “bilingual” classes reportedly reach 2,629 students through 27 secondary schools.⁹² The government prepared a draft opinion in 2008 that details steps to further expand “bilingual” education.⁹³

Authorities also have limited opportunities for XUAR residents to obtain higher education and vocational education in ethnic minority languages, thereby diminishing the value of ethnic minority languages in XUAR schooling and creating an incentive for younger students to study in Mandarin instead of ethnic minority languages. In May 2002, the XUAR government announced that Xinjiang University would change its medium of instruction to

Mandarin Chinese in first- and second-year classes.⁹⁴ In 2005, authorities announced plans to offer two-year vocational degrees through programs that offer instruction entirely in Mandarin Chinese.⁹⁵ Recruitment materials for 2007 for the Xinjiang Preschool Teachers College stated that all classes offered would be taught in Mandarin.⁹⁶

XUAR authorities also have expanded “bilingual” education policies to the preschool level, and provide material incentives to attract students. Authorities issued an opinion in 2005 to bolster “bilingual” education in XUAR preschools and prepared a draft opinion on further expanding “bilingual” education, including preschool education, in 2008.⁹⁷ In 2006, official media reported the government would invest 430 million yuan (US\$59.76 million) over five years to support “bilingual” preschool programs in seven prefectures and would aim to reach a target rate of over 85 percent of rural ethnic minority children in all counties and municipalities able to enroll in two years of “bilingual” preschool education by 2010.⁹⁸ The following year, the XUAR Department of Finance allotted 70.39 million yuan (US\$9.78 million) to cover material subsidies for both students and teachers in “bilingual” preschool programs.⁹⁹ In February 2007, authorities in the XUAR implemented a program to send student-teachers from the Xinjiang Preschool Teachers College to preschools in Kashgar prefecture to supplement the area’s shortage of “bilingual” teaching staff, providing financial and other incentives to the student-teachers in the program.¹⁰⁰ In 2008, the government appeared to have pushed back its timeline for reaching target enrollment rates, while investing more money to bring this goal to fruition, perhaps signifying a firmer and more realistic commitment to promoting “bilingual” preschool education. The government pledged 3.75 billion yuan (US\$549 million) in 2008 for “bilingual” preschool education and called for achieving a target rate of over 85 percent of ethnic minority children in rural areas receiving “bilingual” education by 2012.¹⁰¹ While the current scope of the program’s coverage varies by locality, news from local governments indicates that “bilingual” preschool programs are already widespread in some areas.¹⁰² According to 2007 figures from the Xinjiang Education Department, 180,458 ethnic minority children received “bilingual” preschool education.¹⁰³

The government’s language policies have impacted ethnic minority teachers’ job prospects. Ethnic minority teachers who do not speak Mandarin must face additional language requirements that are not imposed on monolingual Mandarin-speaking teachers. Teachers have reportedly faced dismissal or transfers to non-teaching positions for failure to conform to new language requirements.¹⁰⁴

The Chinese government’s current stance on “bilingual” education hinders productive dialogue on ways to carry forward policies in a manner to protect ethnic minority languages. In March 2008, XUAR Chair Nur Bekri described criticisms of “bilingual” education as an attack from the “three forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism operating outside China. He also claimed that “bilingual” education in the region equally valued ethnic minority languages and Mandarin, despite evidence of the focus on Mandarin from sources including official Chinese media.¹⁰⁵

Although the long-term impact remains unclear, sustained implementation of Mandarin-focused “bilingual” education and other language policies increases the risk that Uyghur and other ethnic minority languages are eventually reduced to cultural relics rather than actively used languages in the XUAR.

ADDENDUM: LABOR CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG

Labor Transfers

While the Chinese government continues to fill local jobs in the XUAR with migrant labor, it also maintains programs that send young ethnic minorities to work in factories in China’s interior under conditions reported to be abusive. Overseas sources indicate that local authorities have coerced participation and mistreated workers. According to a 2008 report issued by an overseas human rights organization, local officials, following direction from higher levels of government, have used “deception, pressure, and threats” toward young women and their families to gain recruits into the labor transfer program. Women interviewed for the report described working under abusive labor conditions after being transferred to interior factories through the state-sponsored programs.¹⁰⁶ In 2007, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported on local authorities who recruited women under false pretenses to work in Shandong province.¹⁰⁷

Forced Labor

In 2007 and 2008, overseas media reported that authorities in the XUAR continued to impose forced labor on area farmers. According to reports from RFA, based on official Chinese sources and on information provided through interviews with officials and residents in the XUAR, in 2007 authorities in Yeken (Yarkand) county required 100,000 farmers to turn uncultivated land into a nut production base. The farmers, whose work included building roadways, forest belts, and irrigation canals, reportedly received no pay for their work. One resident interviewed by RFA said that residents who refused to do the work were fined for each day of labor missed.¹⁰⁸ The Kashgar district government, which publicized information about the land cultivation project, including the scope of labor involved and the projects completed, did not describe how the labor force was recruited or compensated.¹⁰⁹ Authorities reportedly continued to carry out forced labor in 2008, requiring local residents in the southern XUAR to plant trees and build irrigation works.¹¹⁰

“Work-Study” Programs

The XUAR government imposes forced labor on local students to meet yearly harvesting quotas. Acting under central government authority bolstered by local legal directives, XUAR authorities implement the use of student labor, including labor by young children, via work-study programs to harvest crops and do other work. Students work under arduous conditions and do not receive pay for their work. While “work-study” programs exist elsewhere in China, the XUAR work-study program also reflects features unique to the

region. The central government holds close control over both the general XUAR economy and through its directly administered Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps farms, where some of the region's cotton is harvested. The central government placed special focus on supporting the XUAR's cotton industry during its 11th Five-Year Program, and central, rather than local, authorities reportedly made the decision to launch the comprehensive work-study program to pick cotton in the XUAR. In 2007, Chinese media reported that work-study programs requiring students to pick cotton have decreased in recent years, but also reported that some 1 million students picked cotton in the region that year.¹¹¹

ADDENDUM: ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN XINJIANG

Ethnic minority residents in the XUAR face special barriers to accessing China's legal system. In addition to financial shortfalls and general personnel shortages, the XUAR judicial system lacks a sufficient number of legal personnel and translators who speak ethnic minority languages, entrenching systemic procedural irregularities into the judicial process and presenting barriers to citizens' right to have legal proceedings conducted in their native language.¹¹² According to 2007 reports from the Chinese media, 1,948 of 4,552 judges in the XUAR were ethnic minorities, and as of September of that year, 380 lawyers, or 17 percent of the region's total, were ethnic minorities. The reports did not identify the language capabilities of these groups.¹¹³ A law office reported as China's first bilingual operation opened in the XUAR in 2006.¹¹⁴

Recent measures to address shortcomings in the XUAR judicial system may have mixed results in meeting the needs of ethnic minority residents. Efforts to dispatch legal workers to rural areas may strengthen privilege for Mandarin Chinese if new personnel are not required to speak ethnic minority languages.¹¹⁵ Other steps may bring improvements. In 2007, the Ili Lawyers Association in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, for example, reportedly encouraged law offices to increase efforts to recruit ethnic minority graduates who majored in law in college or other higher education programs.¹¹⁶ In September 2007, the government announced a program to train 200 native Mandarin-speaking college students each year in ethnic minority languages, with the goal of addressing general shortages of interpreters.¹¹⁷

The government ties some judicial reform efforts to government campaigns to promote "stability" and fight the government-designated "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. In August 2007, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) announced it had launched a work program to have judicial institutions nationwide aid XUAR courts, describing having stability in the region as part of its strategy for the project.¹¹⁸ Jiang Xingchang, vice president of the SPC, said that China continued to face plots by "hostile forces in the West" to westernize and divide China, and that "religious extremism" and "international terrorism" remain "fully active" in the XUAR, while ethnic separatists inside and outside the country continue "sabotage activities."¹¹⁹ Jiang also stated that personnel of the appropriate political mindset should be selected for judicial exchange programs in the XUAR.¹²⁰ In August 2008, Chinese media

reported that XUAR courts would “regard ensuring [state] security and social stability [as] their primary task.”¹²¹

FREEDOM OF RELIGION—ISLAM

[EXCERPTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA’S 2008 ANNUAL REPORT—SECTION II, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, PAGES 80–82.]

Authorities increased repression of Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the past year, while the government and Party continued to strictly control the practice of Islam in other parts of the country. The Commission observed broad measures implemented in the XUAR to increase monitoring and control over religious communities and leaders; steps to restrict pilgrimages and the observance of religious holidays and customs; and continued measures to restrict children’s freedom of religion. Throughout China, Muslims remained subject to state-sanctioned interpretations of their faith and to tight state control over their pilgrimage activities.

INCREASED REPRESSION IN XINJIANG

Authorities increased repression in the XUAR amid preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, protests in Uyghur and Tibetan areas of China, and government reports of terrorist and criminal activity in the region. During the year, local governments throughout the XUAR reported on measures to tighten control over religion, including measures to increase surveillance of mosques, religious leaders, and practitioners; gather information on practitioners’ religious activities; curb “illegal” scripture readings; and increase accountability among implementing officials. Authorities connected control of religious affairs with measures to promote “social stability” and continued longstanding campaigns to link Islam to “extremism” and the threat of terrorism.¹²² In September 2008, XUAR chair Nur Bekri called for strengthening controls over religion and for increasing political training of religious leaders.¹²³ Amid preparations in the XUAR for the Olympics, overseas media reported in June that authorities in Aqsu district razed a privately built mosque for refusing to post pro-Olympics posters.¹²⁴

Local authorities and educational institutions in the XUAR continued in 2007 and 2008 to impose restrictions on the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, including restrictions on state employees’ observance of the holiday and prohibitions on closing restaurants during periods of fasting.¹²⁵ Overseas media reported on the detention of two Muslim restaurant managers for failing to abide by instructions to keep restaurants open.¹²⁶ Authorities intensified limits on the observance of Ramadan with measures to curb broader religious and cultural practices.¹²⁷ Some local governments reported on measures to prevent women from wearing head coverings.¹²⁸ In March, women in Hoten district who demonstrated against various human rights abuses in the region protested admonishments against such apparel issued during a government campaign to promote stability.¹²⁹

The XUAR government continues to maintain the harshest legal restrictions on children’s right to practice religion. Regionwide legal

measures forbid parents and guardians from allowing minors to engage in religious activity.¹³⁰ In August 2008, authorities reportedly forced the return of Uyghur children studying religion in another province and detained them in the XUAR for engaging in “illegal religious activities.”¹³¹ Local governments continued to implement restrictions on children’s freedom of religion, taking steps including monitoring students’ eating habits during Ramadan and strengthening education in atheism, as part of broader controls over religion implemented in the past year.¹³² Overseas sources have reported that some local governments have enforced restrictions on mosque entry by minors, as well as other populations.¹³³

RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO MAKE OVERSEAS PILGRIMAGES

XUAR authorities continued in the past year to support measures to prevent Muslims from making pilgrimages outside of state channels, following the confiscation of Muslims’ passports in summer 2007 to restrict private pilgrimages.¹³⁴ Officials also reportedly imposed extra restrictions on Uyghurs’ participation in state-sanctioned pilgrimages.¹³⁵ According to overseas media, authorities reportedly gave prison sentences to five Uyghur clerics for arranging pilgrimages without government permission.¹³⁶

The central government continued to maintain limits on all Muslims’ pilgrimage activities, after intensifying state controls over the hajj in 2006.¹³⁷ While the government permitted more than 10,000 Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca under official auspices in 2007,¹³⁸ pilgrims had to abide by state controls over the trip. Among various controls, participants have been subject to “patriotic education” prior to departure¹³⁹ and to restrictions on their activities within Mecca in a stated effort to guard against contact with “East Turkistan forces” and other “enemy forces.”¹⁴⁰

CONTINUING CONTROLS OVER INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DOCTRINE

The government continued to tightly control the internal affairs of Muslim communities. The state-controlled Islamic Association of China aligns Muslim practice to government and Party goals by directing the confirmation and ongoing political indoctrination of religious leaders, publication of religious texts, and content of sermons.¹⁴¹ In the past year, authorities called for continued measures to control religious doctrine. In a 2008 interview, Ye Xiaowen, head of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, justified state interference in the interpretation of Islamic doctrine on the grounds of “public interests.”¹⁴² According to a 2008 report from the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, a Communist Party official who took part in leading “study classes” for Muslim personnel in the region called for “creatively interpreting and improving” religious doctrine.¹⁴³

Endnotes

¹See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 106–108; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 90–91; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 21–23.

²For detailed information, including information on China's domestic and international obligations toward ethnic minorities, see Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights, as well as the section on “Ethnic Minority Rights” in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 105–108 and “Special Focus for 2005: China's Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law,” CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 13–23.

³The government has long claimed the continued existence of terrorist and separatist threats through spurious statistics and shoddy factual support. For an analysis of Chinese reporting on terrorist activity, see “Uighurs Face Extreme Security Measures; Official Statements on Terrorism Conflict,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2006, 12.

⁴For an analysis of Chinese reporting on one of the alleged terrorist plots and on the aircraft attack, see “Xinjiang Authorities Pledge Crackdown Against ‘Three Forces,’” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/April 2008, 2. For more information on two of the alleged terrorist plots, see “Ministry of Public Security Circulates Notice on Recently Cracking 2 Cases of Plots To Carry Out Terrorist Activity” [Gong'anbu tongbao jinqi pohuo de liangqi cehua shishi baoli kongbu huodong anjian], Tianshan Net (Online), 10 March 08.

⁵For reporting from local Xinjiang government Web sites, see, e.g., Kashgar District Government (Online), “Let Society Be Stable and Harmonious, For the People To Be Without Fear—Work Report on Poskam County Striving To Establish a Region-Level Quiet and Stable County” [Rang shehui wending hexie wei baixing anjuleye—zhexian zheng chuang zizhiqi ping'an xian gongzuo jishi], 3 December 07; Qumul District Government (Online), “Gülshat Abduhadir Stresses at District Education Work Meeting, Enlarge Investments for Optimal Environment” [Gulixiati Abudouhade'er zai diqu jiaoyu gongzuo huiyishang qiangdiao jiada touru youhua huanjing], 9 March 08; Kashgar District Government (Online), “Yengi Sheher County Takes Forceful Measures to Strengthen Carrying Out of Current Stability Work” [Shulexian caiqu youli cuoshi jiaqiang zuohao dangqian wending gongzuo], 31 March 08; Kashgar District Government (Online), “Firmly Grasp Stability Work without Slackening, Protect Smooth Carrying Out of the Olympics” [Hen zhua wei wen gongzuobuxiedai bao aoyunhui shunli juban], 31 March 08; Kashgar District Government (Online), “122 Members of ‘Work Team Dispatched to Rural Posts for Olympics Safety and Security’ Go to Countryside in Yorpugha County” [Yuepuhuxian 122 ming “ao yun an bao paizhu xiangcun gongzuo duiyuan” xiacun], 28 March 08. For an example of a security measure aimed at XUAR residents living in other parts of China, see “Kashgar District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission Enters into Friendly Cooperation with Wuhan City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission” [Kashi diqu minzongwei yu wuhanshi minzongwei jiewei youhao xiezuo danwei], China Ethnicities News (Online), 28 February 08. Overseas organizations reported on the imposition of martial order within Ghulja in late March and April and on curfews in multiple cities. Local government Web sites within China appear not to have publicized the curfews. International Campaign for Tibet (Online), “Tibetan Students Hold Vigil in Beijing; Curfew Imposed in Xinjiang Towns,” 17 March 08; “FYI—Kashgar, Xinjiang PRC Media Not Observed To Report Alleged Curfew,” Open Source Center, 19 March 08; “FYI—Hotan, Xinjiang PRC Media Not Observed To Report Alleged Curfew,” Open Source Center, 19 March 08; “Chinese Government Exercises Martial Alert in Ghulja” [Xitay hökümiti ghuljida herbiy halet yürgüzüwatidu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 April 08; “Curfew in Xinjiang Town After Police Raids,” Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 March 08.

⁶“Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain Protesters,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 3.

⁷“The Human Toll of the Olympics,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, August 2008, 2–8.

⁸For information on these attacks as reported by official Chinese media, see, e.g., “Police Station Raided in West China's Xinjiang, Terrorist Plot Suspected,” Xinhua, 4 August 08 (Open Source Center, 4 August 08); “Xinjiang Official Calls Monday's Raid on Border Police a Terrorist Attack,” Xinhua, 5 August 08 (Open Source Center, 5 August 08); “Bombings Kill Eight, Injure Four in China's Xinjiang,” Xinhua, 10 August 08 (Open Source Center, 12 August 08); Mao Yong and Zhao Chunhui, “(Explosions in Xinjiang's Kuqa) Violent Terrorism in Kuqa County, Xinjiang, Effectively Dealt With,” Xinhua, 10 August 08 (Open Source Center, 10 August 08); “Three Security Staff Killed in Attack at Road Checkpoint in Xinjiang,” Xinhua (Online), 12 August 08. For an updated report by foreign media on one of the events, see Edward Wong, “Doubt Arises in Account of an Attack in China,” New York Times (Online), 28 September 08.

⁹For an overview of these reported measures, see box titled Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics in this section, which is drawn from “Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang in Lead-up To and During Olympics,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 7 October 08. See specific sources at, e.g., Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), “A Life or Death Struggle in East Turkestan; Uyghurs Face Unprecedented Persecution in post-Olympic Period,” 4 September 08, 4–7; “Homes Raided in Xinjiang,” Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 July 08; Jüme, “Public Security Office Police in Ghulja City Ransack Uyghurs' Homes” [Ghulja shehiri j x idarisi saqchiliri uyghurlarning öylirini axturmaqta], Radio Free Asia (Online), 17 July 08; “The Human Toll of the Olympics,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update; Dan Martin, “Uyghurs Discouraged From Air Travel Amid China's Olympic Security Clampdown,” Agence France-Presse, 31 July 08 (Open Source Center, 31 July 08); Malcom Moore, “China Tightens Grip on Western Province Xinjiang,” Telegraph (Online), 8 August 08; Gülchähre, “Chinese Authorities Close Some Uyghur Discussion Web Sites During Olympics” [Xitay dairiliri olimpiq mezgilide bir qisim uyghur munazire tor betlirini taqidi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 August 08; “Crackdown on Xinjiang Mosques, Religion,” Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 August 08; “Mongghulküre County ‘Protect Olympics, Protect Stability’ Supervision

Group Reports Work to Ili Prefecture” [Zhaosuxian shang yili zhou “bao ao yun cu wending” dudao xiaozu hui bao gongzuo], Ili Peace Net (Online), 16 July 08; “Mongghulküre County Promptly Arranges Implementation of Spirit of Ili 7.13 Stability Meeting” [Zhaosuxian xunsu anpai luoshi yili zhou “7.13” wending huiyi jingshen], Ili Peace Net (Online), 16 July 08; Kashgar District Government, “Usher in the Olympics and Ensure Stability; Jiashi People Are of One Heart and Mind,” 8 August 08 (Open Source Center, 8 August 08). See also Controls over Free Expression in Xinjiang in this section for more information on controls over Web sites.

¹⁰Jake Hooker, “China Steps Up Scrutiny of a Minority in Beijing,” New York Times (Online), 13 August 08; Josephine Ma, “Beijing Security Already High, With More Police Checks on Uyghurs And,” [sic] South China Morning Post, 5 August 08 (Open Source Center, 5 August 08); “Hotels in All Locations Must Report Tibetans, Uyghurs and Other Ethnic Minority Guests” [Gedi luguan dei tongbao jiangzang deng shaoshu minzu zhuke], Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 July 08; “Beijing and Shanghai Strengthen Inspection and Control of Uyghurs and Tibetans on Eve of Olympics” [Ao yun qianxi jing hu jiaqiang dui weizu zangzuren de jiankong], Radio Free Asia (Online), 27 July 08; “Olympic Terror Clampdown Targets Beijing Uyghurs After Attacks,” Bloomberg (Online), 18 August 08.

¹¹“Nur Bekri’s Speech at Autonomous Region Cadre Plenary Session” [Nu’er Baikeli zai zizhiqu ganbu dahui shang de jianghua], Tianshan Net (Online), 11 September 08. For an example of mention of Rebiya Kadeer in local government reports, see “Firmly Grasp the Overall Situation, Unite the Masses, Conscientiously Forge Firm Foundation to Protect Stability” [Bawo daju tuanjie qunzhong qieshi da lao weiwen jichu], Ili News Net (Online), 21 September 08.

¹²For reports from local offices and governments, see, e.g., “Zhang Yun Stresses: Make Firm Push To Deepen Educational Activities” [Zhang yun qiangdiao: zhashi ba zhuti jiaoyu huodong tuixiang shenru], Ili News Net (Online), 25 September 08; “Must Have Vigorous Education Propaganda” [Zhuti jiaoyu xuanchuan bixu honghonglielie], Ili Daily News reprinted in Ili News Net (Online), 16 September 08; “Autonomous Region Youth League Committee Launches Ethnic Unity Education Practicum Activities” [Zizhiqu tuanwei kaizhan minzu tuanjie jiaoyu shijian huodong], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 12 September 08. For Wang’s comments, see “Autonomous Region Convenes Cadre Plenary Session on Making Concerted Efforts to Safeguard Xinjiang’s Social and Political Stability” [Zizhiqu zhaokai ganbu dahui qixinxieli weihu xinjiang shehui zhengzhi wending], Tianshan Net (Online), 11 September 08; “Wang Lequan’s Speech at Autonomous Region 5th Commendation Meeting on Advancement of Ethnic Unity” [Wang Lequan zai zizhiqu di wu ci minzu tuanjie jinbu biao Zhang dahui shang de jianghua], Tianshan Net (Online), 16 September 08.

¹³For an overview of incarceration trends from the mid-1990s onward, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 107 and accompanying footnotes.

¹⁴According to the head of the XUAR High People’s Court, since 2003, XUAR courts have accepted a yearly average of roughly 150 cases involving endangering state security. “Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts is Launched” [Quanguo fayuan duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo qidong], Xinhua (Online), 14 August 07. Nationwide, the number of arrests between 2003 and 2006 for endangering state security numbered 336, 426, 296, and 604 respectively, and the number of such cases that authorities began to prosecute in 2005 and 2006 were 185 and 258 respectively, indicating that cases from the XUAR constituted a significant total percentage both of arrests and prosecutions for endangering state security. The Dui Hua Foundation (Online), “New Statistics Point to Dramatic Increase in Chinese Political Arrests in 2006,” 27 November 07; The Dui Hua Foundation (Online), “Endangering State Security’ Arrests Rise More than 25% in 2004,” Dialogue Newsletter, Winter 2006.

¹⁵“Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts is Launched,” Xinhua.

¹⁶Yan Wenlu, “Xinjiang Higher People’s Court To Sternly Crack Down on Crimes of the ‘Three Forces’ in Accordance With the Law,” China News Agency, 15 August 08 (Open Source Center, 15 August 08).

¹⁷Except where otherwise noted, information in this boxed subsection is drawn from “Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang in Lead-up To and During Olympics,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China.

¹⁸Information in this bulleted item, other than information on Ramadan, is drawn from “Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang in Lead-up To and During Olympics,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China. For information on controls over Ramadan, see, e.g., Shayar County Government (Online), “Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures To Strengthen Management During Ramadan” [Shayaxian yingmaili zhen caiqu jiu xiang cuoshijiaqiang “zhaiyue” qijian guanli], 28 August 08; “Five Measures from Mongghulküre County Ensure Ramadan Management and Olympics Security” [Zhaosuxian wu cuoshi tiqian zuohao zhaiyue guanli bao ao yun wending], Fazhi Xinjiang (Online), 23 August 08; “Toqsu County Deploys Work to Safeguard Stability During Ramadan” [Xinhexian bushu zhaiyue qijian weiwen gongzuo], Xinjiang Peace Net (Online), 2 September 08. See also Section II—Freedom of Religion—China’s Religious Communities—Islam.

¹⁹“Uyghur Radio Worker Sacked, Detained,” Radio Free Asia (Online), 8 September 08; “Supplementary Information on Prisoner Mehbube Ablesh” [Tutqun mehbube ablesh heqqide toluqlima melumatlar], Radio Free Asia (Online), 8 September 08; “Uyghur Staff Member in Xinjiang Criticizes Government, Is Arrested” [Xinjiang weizu yuangong piping zhengfu bei jubu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 September 08.

²⁰While “Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications” campaigns targeting a range of materials exist throughout China, authorities in the XUAR target religious and political materials also as part of broader controls in the region over Islamic practice and other expressions of ethnic identity among the Uyghur population. “Xinjiang Government Strengthens Campaign Against Political and Religious Publications,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2008, 4.

²¹In May 2006, for example, XUAR authorities launched a month-long campaign aimed at rooting out “illegal” political and religious publications in which they reported finding “the existence of books with seriously harmful religious inclinations,” and Uyghur-language religious materials with “unhealthy content.” “Xinjiang Government Seizes, Confiscates Political and Religious Publications,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 7–8. In February 2006, authorities confiscated “illegal” religious materials during a surprise inspection of the ethnic minority language publishing market, as part of a campaign that included focus on materials of an “illegal” political nature, those that propagate ethnic separatism, or those of a religious nature. “Xinjiang Cracks Down on ‘Illegal’ Religious Publications,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, April 2006, 9.

²²“Atush Launches Clean-up Operation in Publishing Market” [Atushi shi kaizhan chubanyu shichang zhuanxiang zhili xingdong], Qizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture Peace Net (Online), 11 July 08; Jüme, “Chinese Government Starts Urgent Search Activities on Streets of Atush” [Xitay hökümiti atush shehiridiki dukan-restilerde jiddiy axturush herikiti bashlidi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 17 July 08.

²³Gülchéhre, “Chinese Authorities Close Some Uyghur Discussion Web Sites During Olympics” [Xitay dairiliri olimpiq mezigilde bir qisim uyghur munazire tor betlirini taqidi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 August 08. In a review of Uyghur Web sites carried out on August 18 and 19, 2008, Commission staff found that the bulletin board services (BBS) on the Web sites www.diyarim.com, www.orkhun.com, and www.alkuyi.com blocked normal message-posting functions and carried messages calling for stability during the Olympics games or noting the closure of the site’s BBS. In June, 2008, overseas media noted the closure of the Web site Uyghur Online due to perceived ties with overseas “extremists.” See “Uyghur Web Site Shut Down,” Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 June 08. See also “Notice Concerning the Closure of Uyghur Online” [Guanyu weiwuer zai xian bei guanbi de tongzhi], available at <http://www.uighuronline.cn/> (last visited 19 May 2008). As of September 11, 2008, Commission staff observed that the site was in operation again.

²⁴For information on the Islamic Association of China’s publishing activities and state controls over the interpretation of religious texts, see “SARA Director Calls for Continued Controls on Religion,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 8, and “Islamic Congress Establishes Hajj Office, Issues New Rules,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 12–13.

²⁵“Teacher and 37 Students Detained for Studying [sic] Koran in China: Rights Group” Agence France-Presse, 15 August 05 (Open Source Center, 15 August 05); “Three Detained in East Turkistan for ‘Illegal’ Religious Text,” Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), 3 August 05; Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China (Online), “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,” April 2005, 70 (pagination follows “text-only” pdf download of this report).

²⁶See, e.g., “Xinjiang Government Promotes Mandarin Chinese Use Through Bilingual Education,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2006, 17–18; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), “This Fall Ethnic Minority Language-Track Middle Schools in Urumchi, Xinjiang, Try ‘Bilingual’ Education” [Jin qiu xinjiang wulumuqishi minyuxi chuzhong changshi “shuangyu” jiaoyu], reprinted on the State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 9 May 08.

²⁷See, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 4, 121, and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted 31 May 84, amended 28 February 01, art. 10, 21. Chinese law also promotes education in ethnic minority languages. See REAL, art. 37. 2005 Implementing Provisions for the REAL affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting “bilingual” education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL Implementing Provisions) [Guowuyuan shishi “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyü zizhifa” ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, art. 22.

²⁸“Xinjiang Bilingual Education Students Increase 50-fold in 6 Years” [Xinjiang shuangyu xuesheng liu nien zengzhang 50 bei], Xinjiang Economic News, via Tianshan Net (Online), 31 October 06.

²⁹See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 107; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 91; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 22–23.

³⁰The Xinjiang High People’s Court rejected his appeal in February 2000, but changed the “stealing” state secrets charge to “unlawfully obtaining” them. In 2001, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found his imprisonment arbitrary and in violation of his right to freedom of thought, expression, and opinion. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information on Tohti Tunyaz’s case and the other cases cited in this section.

³¹The precise charges levied against Abduhelil Zunun are unavailable, but Human Rights Watch reported that his sentence took place at a mass sentencing rally to punish terrorist and separatist activities. Human Rights Watch (Online), “China Human Rights Update,” 15 February 02. See also the CECC Political Prisoner Database.

³²See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more details. Sentencing information on the case and Abdulla Jamal’s current whereabouts are not known.

³³See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more details.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵“Uyghur Radio Worker Sacked, Detained,” Radio Free Asia; “Supplementary Information on Prisoner Mehbube Ablesh,” Radio Free Asia; “Uyghur Staff Member in Xinjiang Criticizes Government, Is Arrested,” Radio Free Asia. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more details.

³⁶For a discussion of these groups, known as *meshrep* in Uyghur, see, e.g., Jay Dautcher, “Public Health and Social Pathologies in Xinjiang,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 285–6.

³⁷“Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain Protesters,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.

³⁸The editor has surmised that the charge may have been based on e-mail correspondence the China Development Brief initiated with a Uyghur diaspora organization while conducting research. Nick Young, “Message from the Editor,” China Development Brief (Online), 12 July 07; Nick Young, “Why China Cracked Down on My Nonprofit,” Christian Science Monitor (Online), 4 December 07.

³⁹Authorities also accused the publication’s English-language editor of conducting “unauthorized surveys” and forced the publication’s closing during a period of heightened scrutiny over local and foreign civil society organizations throughout China. Nick Young, “Message from the Editor,” China Development Brief (Online), Nick Young, “Why China Cracked Down on My Nonprofit.” For more information on civil society groups in China, see Section III—Civil Society as well as CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 141–143.

⁴⁰In the course of an interview with Chinese officials, the editor of the China Development Brief (CDB) critiqued repressive policies in the XUAR, comments which he believes might have shut down further negotiations with authorities on ways to salvage CDB. Nick Young, “Why China Cracked Down on My Nonprofit.”

⁴¹While the government continues to impose *hukou*, or household registration requirements, that place restrictions on citizens’ ability to formally change their place of residence and receive social services and other benefits in their new homes, limited *hukou* reforms and other policies have nonetheless given citizens more leeway to migrate internally within China than in previous decades. For more information on freedom of residence, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 111–113.

⁴²See, e.g., REAL Implementing Provisions, art. 29. For additional information, see, e.g., Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,” East-West Center Washington 2004, Policy Studies 11, 24–26.

⁴³Earlier government policies, including forced resettlement to the region, have already resulted in broad demographic shifts in the XUAR. According to an official government census, in 1953, Han Chinese constituted 6 percent of the XUAR’s population of 4.87 million, while Uyghurs made up 75 percent. In contrast, the 2000 census listed the Han population at 40.57 percent and Uyghurs at 45.21 percent of a total population of 18.46 million. Scholar Stanley Toops has noted that Han migration since the 1950s is responsible for the “bulk” of the XUAR’s high population growth in the past half century. Stanley Toops, “Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949,” East-West Center Washington Working Papers No. 1, May 04, 1. See also “Xinjiang Focuses on Reducing Births in Minority Areas to Curb Population Growth,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, April 2006, 15–16; “Xinjiang Reports High Rate of Population Increase,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 16–17.

⁴⁴State Administration for Ethnic Affairs (Online), “Important Meaning” [Zhongyao yiyi], 13 July 04.

⁴⁵See Development Policy in Xinjiang in this section for more information.

⁴⁶Scholar Gardner Bovingdon notes that “Han immigration and state policies have dramatically increased the pressure on Uyghurs to assimilate linguistically and culturally, seemingly contradicting the explicit protections of the constitution and the laws on autonomy[.]” Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,” 47.

⁴⁷As noted above, Han migration has resulted in high population growth in the region. Stanley Toops, “Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949,” 1.

⁴⁸“Xinjiang Focuses on Reducing Births in Minority Areas to Curb Population Growth,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.

⁴⁹“Last Year, 65,000 Fewer People Were Born in Xinjiang” [Qunian xinjiang shao chusheng 6.5 wan ren], Xinjiang Metropolitan News, reprinted in Tianshan Net, 28 February 08. Although the government has implemented policies throughout China to reward families who comply with various population planning dictates, it also continues to punish non-compliance. See Section II—Population Planning, for more information. The XUAR regulation on population planning allows urban Han Chinese couples to have one child, urban ethnic minority couples and rural Han Chinese couples to have two, and rural ethnic minority couples to have three. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Population and Family Planning [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 28 November 02, amended 26 November 04 and 25 May 06, art. 15. While this legislation indicates some flexibility to adapt national legislation to suit “local conditions,” as stipulated in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, XUAR residents nonetheless lack the autonomy to choose not to implement any limits at all on childbearing. REAL, art. 4, 44. For information on the limits of the legal framework for autonomy, see, e.g., CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 15–17. Scholar Gardner Bovingdon discusses the role of population planning requirements within the context of the regional ethnic autonomy system in Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,” 26.

⁵⁰See, e.g., Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), “Rural East Turkistan To Be ‘Focus’ of China’s Family Planning Policies,” 15 February 06; Human Rights in China: Improving or Deteriorating Conditions? Hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 19 April 06, Testimony of Rebiya Kadeer.

⁵¹For more details, see the CECC Political Prisoner Database as well as the sources cited below.

⁵²“Chinese Police Attempt to Take into Custody Son of Uyghur Activist Rebiya Kadeer,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2005, 10; “Rebiya Kadeer’s Employees Released After Seven-Month Detention,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2006, 4–5.

⁵³“Xinjiang Police Form Special Unit To Investigate Exiled Activist Rebiya Kadeer,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, October 2005, 7–8.

⁵⁴“Xinjiang Authorities Question Rebiya Kadeer’s Son, Name Him a Criminal Suspect,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2006, 5–6.

⁵⁵“Rebiya Kadeer’s Sons Charged With State Security and Economic Crimes,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 3–4.

⁵⁶“Rebiya Kadeer’s Sons Receive Prison Sentence, Fines, for Alleged Economic Crimes,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 15–16.

⁵⁷Uyghur American Association (Online), “Son of Rebiya Kadeer Sentenced to Nine Years in Prison on Charges of ‘Secessionism,’” 17 April 07.

⁵⁸Uyghur American Association (Online), “Rebiya Kadeer’s Imprisoned Son in Urgent Need of Medical Treatment,” 11 December 07.

⁵⁹See, e.g., Calla Weimer, “The Economy of Xinjiang,” in *Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland*, 188 (noting improvements in transport and communications that have produced “broad benefits” in the region.); Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,” 38.

⁶⁰State Administration for Ethnic Affairs (Online), “Important Meaning.”

⁶¹Stanley W. Toops, “The Ecology of Xinjiang: A Focus on Water,” in *Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland*, 270–271.

⁶²Although the Chinese government does not aggregate economic data by ethnic group, scholars who have looked at other indicators have noted that the most prosperous regions in the XUAR are those with majority Han populations. Areas in the XUAR with overwhelmingly ethnic minority populations remain the region’s poorest. Weimer, “The Economy of Xinjiang,” 177–180; David Bachman, “Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han?” in *Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 165–168.

⁶³Weimer, “The Economy of Xinjiang,” 179–180; Bachman, “Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han?” 167–168; Ildikó Bellér-Hann, “Temperamental Neighbors: Uyghur-Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest China,” in Günther Schlee, ed., *Imagined Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 65.

⁶⁴See Weimer, “The Economy of Xinjiang,” 163 (noting strong government control over both oil and gas reserves and over the general economy).

⁶⁵Scholar Calla Weimer has noted that “in an effort to ensure stability in a frontier area,” the central government “has more actively asserted its control over development in Xinjiang than in any other region.” Weimer, “The Economy of Xinjiang,” 164. For statements connecting development projects to stability, see, e.g., “While Joining NPC Deputies From Xinjiang in Discussing and Examining the Government’s Work Report, General Hu Jintao Stresses That It Is Necessary To Firmly Grasp the Opportunity To Carry out the Large-Scale Development of the Western Region and Continuously Create a New Situation in the Development of Various Undertakings in Xinjiang,” *Xinjiang Daily*, 9 March 08 (Open Source Center, 15 March 08); “State Council Made Major Strategic Plans To Further Promote Xinjiang’s Economic, Social Development,” *Xinjiang Daily*, 3 October 07 (Open Source Center, 3 October 07); Kashgar District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (Online), “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chair Ismail Tiliwaldi Attends Ceremony for Laying Foundation for Kashgar-Hoten Highway” [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu zhuxi simayi tiliwaerdi chuxi kashi zhi hetian gaodengji gonglu dianji yishi], reprinted on the State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 20 November 07.

⁶⁶In 2007, the government announced that it had invested over 231 million yuan from 2001–2006 in funds to support ethnic minority development, using the money for healthcare, education, cultural undertakings, and broadcast communications. It also announced plans to increase funds for 2007. “State Invests 300 Million Yuan in 7 Years to Support Xinjiang Ethnic Minority Economic Development” [Guojia 7 nian tou 3 yi yuan fuchi xinjiang shaoshu minzu jingji fazhan], *Xinjiang Daily* (Online), 17 September 07.

⁶⁷For Chinese media reports on the programs, see, e.g., “Money From Our Kids Has Come” [Zan haizi qiqian laile], *Tianshan Net* (Online), 25 June 07; Qarghiliq County Government (Online), “Leaving Home for the Wide World, Qarghiliq County’s Second Batch of 313 Young Girls Go to Tianjin To Start Their Undertakings” [Zouchu jiamen tiandi kuan yecheng xian di er pi 313 ming nu qingnian fu tianjin chuanyue], 17 April 07. For statistics on the makeup of the labor force and number of people transferred from Kashgar district, see “160 Rural Women from Kashgar Go to Tianjin To Apply Their Labor” [Xinjiang kashi 160 ming nongcun funu fu tianjin wugong], *Urumqi Evening News*, reprinted in *Tianshan Net*, 19 March 07.

⁶⁸Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), “Deception, Pressure, and Threats: The Transfer of Young Uyghur Women to Eastern China,” 8 February 08; Trafficking in China, Briefing of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, U.S. House of Representatives, 31 October 07, Testimony of Rebiya Kadeer, President of the Uyghur American Association; “Uyghur Girls Forced Into Labor Far From Home By Local Chinese Officials,” *Radio Free Asia* (Online), 11 July 07.

⁶⁹For information on forced labor (*hashar*, also sometimes translated as “corvée labor”) in English, see *Radio Free Asia’s* blog “RFA Unplugged.” “Forced, Unpaid Labor for Uyghurs in China’s Almond Groves,” *RFA Unplugged* (Online), 9 April 07. For Uyghur-language reporting on the topic, see Gülchêhre, “Forced Labor Started Once Again in Kashgar Countryside” [Qeshqer yézilirida hashar yene bashlandi], *Radio Free Asia* (Online), 7 February 07; Gülchêhre, “100,000 Farmers in Yeken [Yarkand] Caught Up in Wide-Scale Forced Labor” [Yekende yüz ming dehqan keng kölemlik hashargha tutuldi], *Radio Free Asia* (Online), 11 March 07; Gülchêhre, “Wide-Scale Forced Labor Started Again in Kashgar Countryside” [Qeshqer yézilirida keng kölemlik hashar yene bashlandi], *Radio Free Asia* (Online), 20 March 08. For Chinese government reporting on the topic, see Kashgar District Government (Online), “Yeken [Yarkand] County Starts Springtime Wave to Cultivate Desert Land” [Shachexian xianqi chunji gebi kaihuang zaotian rechao], 9 March 07; Kashgar District Government (Online), “100,000 Rural Laborers Build Pistachio Base in Yeken [Yarkand] County” [Shachexian shi wan nongmingong jianshe kaixinguo jidi], 20 March 07.

⁷⁰“Work-Study Programs Using Child Labor Continue in Xinjiang,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 5. See also “Xinjiang Government Continues

Controversial 'Work-Study' Program," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 11.

⁷¹"Civil Servant Recruitment in Xinjiang Favors Han Chinese," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, August 2006, 6; "Xinjiang Government Says Ethnic Han Chinese Will Get 500 of 700 New Civil Service Appointments," Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 7 April 05; CECC Staff Interviews. In addition, new requirements imposed through the government's "bilingual" education policies disadvantage the job prospects of ethnic minority teachers. For more information, see Addendum: "Bilingual" Education in Xinjiang at the end of this section.

⁷²According to one report, personnel shortcomings have meant that "there is no way to guarantee the use of ethnic minority languages to carry out litigation." "Meticulously Picking Talent: Problem of Faultline in Xinjiang Courts Makes First Steps at Improvement" [Jingxin linxuan rencai xinjiang faguan duanceng wenti chubu huanjie], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 February 06. See also "Lack of Ethnic Minority Judges in Xinjiang Basic-Level Courts Especially Prominent" [Xinjiang jiceng fayuan shaoshu minzu faguan buzu youwei tuchu], Xinhua (Online), 22 November 07; "Courts throughout Country to Join Forces to Help Xinjiang" [Quanguo fayuan jiang heli yuan jiang], Tianshan Net (Online), 20 August 07. The shortage of legal personnel and interpreters who speak ethnic minority languages also impacts legal proceedings outside the XUAR, especially since the Supreme People's Court returned to the process of reviewing all death sentences levied within China. See "China Exclusive: More Ethnic Judges, Translators Needed To Cope With Stricter Death Penalty," Xinhua, 13 March 07 (Open Source Center, 13 March 07). For legal bases to have judicial proceedings conducted in one's native language, see, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 134; REAL, art. 47; Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 January 79, amended 17 March 96, art. 9; Administrative Procedure Law, enacted 4 April 89, art. 8; Civil Procedure Law, enacted 9 April 91, amended 28 October 07, art. 11; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Spoken and Written Language Work [Xinjiang weiwei'er zizhiq yuyan wenzi gongzuo tiaoli], adopted 25 September 93, amended 20 September 02, art. 12.

⁷³Information within is based on CECC Staff Interviews except where otherwise noted.

⁷⁴For background information, including reports from China and neighboring countries along with reports from overseas observers, see, e.g., Li Zhongfa, "Hu Jintao Holds Talks With Kyrgyz President Bakiyev," Xinhua, 9 June 06 (Open Source Center, 11 June 06); "Cooperation With China Strengthened: Uzbek President," Xinhua, 19 June 06 (Open Source Center, 10 June 06); "China's 'Uyghur Problem' and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," Hearing on China's Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 3-4 August 06, Testimony of Dru Gladney, Professor of Asian Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa; "China Tightly Controls the Cradles of the 'Xinjiang Independence' Forces," Ta Kung Pao, 25 August 06 (Open Source Center, 26 August 06); "China To Urge Tougher Counter-Terrorism Measures at SCO 22 Sep Session," Agence France-Presse, 21 September 06 (Open Source Center, 21 September 06); Tao Shelan, "Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chairman Ismail Tiliwaldi: Clamping Down On Terrorism Is Common Aspiration of Peace-Loving People," China News Agency, 16 May 07 (Open Source Center, 19 May 07); "SCO Nations End Consultations on Anti-Terrorism Military Exercise," Xinhua, 19 May 07 (Open Source Center, 19 May 07); Yu Sui, "Hu's Visit Set To Boost Regional Cooperation," China Daily, 14 August 07 (Open Source Center, 14 August 07); Erica Marat, "Chinese Migrants Face Discrimination in Kyrgyzstan," Jamestown Foundation (Online), 28 February 08; Robert Sutter, "Durability in China's Strategy Toward Central Asia—Reasons for Optimism," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 6, No. 1, 2008, 3-10. See also the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Web site at www.setsco.org.

⁷⁵CECC Staff Interviews. Barriers to local asylum proceedings have resulted in problems including statelessness. For more information, see, e.g., Refugees International (Online), "Kazakhstan: Neglecting Refugees, Engendering Statelessness," 21 December 07; Refugees International (Online), "Kyrgyz Republic: Powerful Neighbors Imperil Protection and Create Statelessness," 20 December 07; Refugees International (Online), "Refugee Voices: Uyghurs in Kyrgyz Republic," 9 January 08.

⁷⁶CECC Staff Interviews; Amnesty International (Online), "Central Asia Summary of Human Rights Concerns January 2006-March 2007," 2007; Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China (Online), "Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang," 24; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State (Online), Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2005, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 8 March 06.

⁷⁷Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 51 by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 50, art. 33.

⁷⁸Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, art. 3(1).

⁷⁹International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 12(2).

⁸⁰See, e.g., "Xinjiang Government Promotes Mandarin Chinese Use Through Bilingual Education," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2006, 17-18; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Ethnic Affairs Commission, "This Fall Ethnic Minority Language-Track Middle Schools in Urumchi, Xinjiang, Try 'Bilingual' Education" [Jin qiu xinjiang wulumuqishi minyuxi chuzhong changshi "shuangyu" jiaoyu], reprinted on the State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 9 May 08.

⁸¹See, e.g., "Xinjiang's First Round of Love My China Ethnic Minority Youth Bilingual Oral Speech Contest Opens" [Xinjiang shoujie ai wo zhonghua shaoshu minzu shao'er shuangyu kouyu dasai qimu], Tianshan Net (Online), 15 September 06; Kashgar District Government (Online), "Love My China Bilingual Speech Contest Enters Semi-Finals" [Ai wo zhonghua shuangyu dasai jinru fusai], 31 October 06.

⁸²“Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of Politicians Managing Education” [Wang Lequan qiangdiao: jiating luoshi zhengzhijia ban jiaoyu yuanze], Xinhua Economic News, reprinted in Xinhua, 26 April 05.

⁸³Cited in Arianne M. Dwyer, “The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse,” East-West Center Washington 2005, Policy Studies 15, 37.

⁸⁴For these and other protections, see, e.g., PRC Constitution, arts. 4, 121 and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted 31 May 84, amended 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21.

⁸⁵REAL, art. 37. 2005 Implementing Provisions for the REAL affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting “bilingual” education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL Implementing Provisions) [Guowuyuan shishi “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyue zizhifa” ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, art. 22.

⁸⁶“Bilingual” Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/April 2008, 3; “Xinjiang Official Describes Plan to Expand Use of Mandarin in Minority Schools,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 13.

⁸⁷“Decision Concerning the Vigorous Promotion of ‘Bilingual’ Education Work” [Guanyu dali tuijin “shuangyu” jiaoxue gongzuo de jue ding], cited in e.g., “‘Eight Questions’ About Xinjiang ‘Bilingual’ Education Work” [Xinjiang “shuangyu” jiaoxue gongzuo “ba wen”], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 March 08.

⁸⁸“Results of Xinjiang’s Promotion of ‘Bilingual Education’ Remarkable” [Xinjiang tuijin “shuangyu jiaoxue” chengxiao xianzhu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 7 December 05.

⁸⁹“City in Xinjiang Mandates Exclusive Use of Mandarin Chinese in Schools,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 9–10.

⁹⁰“Xinjiang Bilingual Education Students Increase 50-fold in 6 Years” [Xinjiang shuangyu xuesheng liu nian zengzhang 50 bei], Xinjiang Economic News, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 31 October 06.

⁹¹Xinjiang Education Department (Online), “Notice Concerning Soliciting Opinions on ‘Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary ‘Bilingual’ Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions)’” [Guanyu zhengqiu “guanyu jiji, wentuode tuijin shaoshu minzu xueqian he zhongxiaoxue ‘shuangyu’ jiaoxue gongzuo de yijian (zhengqiu yijian)” yijian de tongzhi], 5 May 08.

⁹²“Results of Xinjiang’s Promotion of ‘Bilingual Education’ Remarkable,” Xinjiang Daily.

⁹³Xinjiang Education Department, “Notice Concerning Soliciting Opinions on ‘Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary ‘Bilingual’ Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions)’.”

⁹⁴Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, “Language Blow for China’s Muslims,” BBC (Online), 1 June 2002.

⁹⁵“Xinjiang Vocational Schools To Implement Two-Year Education System, Basic Courses Taught in Mandarin” [Xinjiang zhiye yuanxiao jiang shixing liang nian zhi jiaoyu jichu shiyong hanyu jiangke], Urumqi Evening News, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 27 July 2005.

⁹⁶In contrast, an undated description of the college, available on the XUAR Personnel Department Web site, describes the institution as a combined ethnic minority-Han school that teaches in Mandarin, Uyghur, and Kazakh. “Bilingual” Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.

⁹⁷Opinion Concerning the Strengthening of Ethnic Minority Preschool “Bilingual” Education [Guanyu jiaqiang shaoshu minzu xueqian “shuangyu” jiaoyu de yijian], issued 2005, as cited in “‘Eight Questions’ About Xinjiang ‘Bilingual’ Education Work,” Tianshan Net. Commission staff was unable to locate the original text of this opinion. See also Xinjiang Education Department, “Notice Concerning Soliciting Opinions on ‘Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary ‘Bilingual’ Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions)’.”

⁹⁸“Xinjiang Makes 5-Year 430 Million Yuan Investment To Develop Rural Preschool ‘Bilingual’ Education” [Xinjiang 5 nian tou ru 4.3 yi fazhan nongcun xueqian “shuangyu” jiaoyu], Xinjiang Economic News, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 10 October 06; “Bilingual” Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update. These plans may have stemmed from direction in the 2005 opinion on preschool “bilingual” education. See Opinion Concerning the Strengthening of Ethnic Minority Preschool “Bilingual” Education [Guanyu jiaqiang shaoshu minzu xueqian “shuangyu” jiaoyu de yijian], issued 2005, as cited in “‘Eight Questions’ About Xinjiang ‘Bilingual’ Education Work,” Tianshan Net. Commission staff was unable to locate the original text of this opinion.

⁹⁹[XUAR] Department of Finance Allocates 70.39 Million Yuan To Support Preschool ‘Bilingual’ Education” [Caizhengting xiabo 7039 wan yuan zhichi xueqian “shuangyu” jiaoyu], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 12 November 07; “Bilingual” Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update. The subsidies include 1.5 yuan each day per child for daily expenses, 20 yuan yearly per child for teaching materials, and a 400 yuan monthly subsidy per teacher. The government had announced subsidies for “bilingual” preschool education at least as early as 2005. “Xinjiang Official Describes Plan to Expand Use of Mandarin in Minority Schools,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.

¹⁰⁰“105 Teachers College Students Go to Kashgar, Xinjiang To Support Educational Undertakings” [105 ming shifansheng fu xinjiang kashi zhijiao], Urumqi Evening News, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 28 February 08; “Bilingual” Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.

¹⁰¹“State To Invest 3.75 Billion Yuan To Support Xinjiang ‘Bilingual’ Preschool Education” [Guojia jiang tou ru 37.5 yi yuan zhichi xinjiang xueqian “shuangyu” jiaoyu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 12 September 08.

¹⁰²In June 2007, official media reported that 42.8 percent of rural preschool-age children in Yéngsisheher county, Kashgar district, were enrolled in “bilingual” preschool programs. “40 Percent of Rural Youngsters of Appropriate Age Attend ‘Bilingual’ Preschools,” *Bilingual’ Preschool Education Welcomed by the Farmers of Yéngsisheher* [Si cheng nongcun shiling ertong jiudu “shuangyu” you’eryuan xueqian “shuangyu” jiaoyu shou shule nongmin huanying], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 22 June 07. In December 2007, official media reported that in 2008, all urban ethnic minority children and 90 percent of rural preschool-age ethnic minority children in Bayin’gholin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture—which has a predominantly Uyghur ethnic minority population—would receive “bilingual” education. “Ethnic Minority Youngsters of the Appropriate Age Receive ‘Bilingual’ Education” [Shaoshu minzu shiling ertong jieshou “shuangyu” jiaoxue], Tianshan Net (Online), 26 December 07. The article also noted that all urban elementary school students in first grade and higher would receive “bilingual” education, as would over 80 percent of their rural counterparts. For statistics on the ethnic minority population within the prefecture, see “Introduction to the General Situation in the Bayin’gholin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture” [Bayinguoleng menggu zizhizhou gaikuang jianjie], Xinjiang Investment Net (Online), 24 December 07.

¹⁰³Xinjiang Education Department, “Notice Concerning Soliciting Opinions on ‘Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary “Bilingual” Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions).’”

¹⁰⁴See, e.g., Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), “Uyghur Language Under Attack: The Myth of ‘Bilingual’ Education in the People’s Republic of China,” 24 July 07, 8–9; “Atush Starts Mandarin Chinese-Strengthening Training Class in Shenyang” [Atushi kaiban fu shenyang jiaoshi hanyu qianghua peixunban], Qizilsu News, reprinted on the Qizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture Government Web site, 16 August 06; “China Imposes Chinese Language on Uyghur Schools,” Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 March 04. See also Xinjiang Education Department, “Notice Concerning Soliciting Opinions on ‘Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary “Bilingual” Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions).’” The opinion calls for giving “appropriate placements” to older teachers with poor Mandarin skills.

¹⁰⁵“Autonomous Region Chair Nur Bekri Responds to Separatists’ Attack on Bilingual Education” [Zizhiqu zhuxi nu’er baikeli huiying fenlie fenzi dui shuangyu jiaoyu gongji], Xinjiang Metropolitan News, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 5 March 08; “‘Bilingual’ Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.

¹⁰⁶Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), “Deception, Pressure, and Threats: The Transfer of Young Uyghur Women to Eastern China,” 8 February 08, 4–6.

¹⁰⁷“Uyghur Girls Forced Into Labor Far From Home By Local Chinese Officials,” Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 July 07.

¹⁰⁸Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that the government announced in 2004 that all forced labor (*hashar*, sometimes also translated as “corvée labor”) would be abolished by the end of 2005. While one government official whom RFA broadcasters contacted said that workers were paid and would become owners of the base, another official contacted by RFA said that the laborers would not be paid. The spouse of a third official, who answered a telephone call from RFA, surmised that workers would not be paid. A farmer contacted by RFA reported that 20 laborers per small village were required to work at the site without pay, and were required to pay a fine if they refused. For information in English, see RFA’s blog “RFA Unplugged.” “Forced, Unpaid Labor for Uyghurs in China’s Almond Groves,” RFA Unplugged (Online), 9 April 07. For Uyghur-language reporting on the topic, see, e.g., Gülchéhre, “Forced Labor Started Once Again in Kashgar Villages” [Qeshqer yezilirida hashar yene bashlandi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 February 07; Gülchéhre, “100,000 Farmers in Yeken [County] Involved in Wide-Scale Forced Labor” [Yekende yüz ming déhqan keng kölemlik hashargha tutuldi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 March 07.

¹⁰⁹Kashgar District Government (Online), “Yeken [Yarkand] County Starts Springtime Wave To Cultivate Desert Land” [Shachexian xiangqi chunji gebi kaihuang zaotian rechao], 9 March 07; Kashgar District Government (Online), “100,000 Rural Laborers Build Pistachio Base in Yeken [Yarkand] County” [Shachexian 10 wan nongmingong jianshe kaixinguo jidi], 20 March 07.

¹¹⁰Gülchéhre, “Forced Labor Begins Again on Wide Scale in Kashgar Villages” [Qeshqer yezilirida keng kölemlik hashar yene bashlandi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 March 08.

¹¹¹“Work-Study Programs Using Child Labor Continue in Xinjiang,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 5; “Xinjiang Government Continues Controversial ‘Work-Study’ Program,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 11.

¹¹²According to one report, personnel shortcomings have meant that “there is no way to guarantee the use of ethnic minority languages to carry out litigation.” “Meticulously Picking Talent: Problem of Faultline in Xinjiang Courts Makes First Steps at Improvement” [Jingxin linxuan rencai xinjiang faguan duanceng wenti chubu huanjie], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 February 06. See also “Lack of Ethnic Minority Judges in Xinjiang Basic-Level Courts Especially Prominent” [Xinjiang jiceng fayuan shaoshu minzu faguan buzou youwei tuchu], Xinhua (Online), 22 November 07; “Courts Throughout Country To Join Forces To Help Xinjiang” [Quanguo fayuan jiang heli yuan jiang], Tianshan Net (Online), 20 August 07. The shortage of legal personnel and interpreters who speak ethnic minority languages also impacts legal proceedings outside the XUAR, especially since the Supreme People’s Court returned to the process of reviewing all death sentences levied within China. See “China Exclusive: More Ethnic Judges, Translators Needed To Cope With Stricter Death Penalty,” Xinhua, 13 March 07 (Open Source Center, 13 March 07). For legal bases to have judicial proceedings conducted in one’s native language, see, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 134; Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, enacted 31 May 84, amended 28 February 01, art. 47; Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 January 79, amended 17 March

96, art. 9; Administrative Procedure Law, enacted 4 April 89, art. 8; Civil Procedure Law, enacted 9 April 91, amended 28 October 07, art. 11; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Spoken and Written Language Work [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu yuyan wenzi gongzuo tiaoli], issued 25 September 93, amended 20 September 02, art. 12.

¹¹³“Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts Is Launched” [Quanguo fayuan duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo qidong], Xinhua (Online), 14 August 07; “Xinjiang Actively Constructs Troops of Ethnic Minority Lawyers” [Xinjiang jiji jianshe shaoshu minzu lüshi duiwu], Xinhua, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 15 October 07. There were 316 ethnic minority lawyers, or 15 percent of the total population, in 2006. “Xinjiang Bilingual Lawyers and Courts Develop with Grace” [Xinjiang shuangyu lüshi fating zhan fengcai], Tianshan Net (Online), 19 May 2006. For information on conditions in an individual prefecture, see a description of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, which has 23 ethnic minority lawyers out of a total of 163, in “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Sorely Lacks Ethnic Minority Lawyers” [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu shaoshu minzu lüshi qique], Uyghur Online, 20 April 07.

¹¹⁴“First Bilingual Law Firm in China Hangs Out Its Shingle” [Guonei shoujia shuangyu lüshisuo jiepai], Xinjiang Legal Daily (Online), 30 March 06.

¹¹⁵For an example of efforts to promote staffing in underserved areas, see, e.g., “Meticulously Picking Talent: Problem of Faultline in Xinjiang Courts Makes First Steps at Improvement,” Tianshan Net.

¹¹⁶“Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Sorely Lacks Ethnic Minority Lawyers,” Uyghur Online.

¹¹⁷“Our Region Acts to Train Minority-Han High-Level Bilingual Talent” [Woqu chutai jucuo peiyang minhan jiantong gao cengci shuangyu rencai], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 27 September 07.

¹¹⁸“Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts Is Launched,” Xinhua.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

¹²⁰Supreme People’s Court, “National Forum Opens To Discuss Courts’ Work To Assist Their Counterparts in Xinjiang—Jiang Xingchang Calls For Forming a Long-Term Mechanism To Assist Xinjiang and Raise the Judicial Capability of Its Courts,” 14 August 07 (Open Source Center, 20 August 07).

¹²¹Yan Wenlu, “Xinjiang Higher People’s Court To Sternly Crack Down on Crimes of the ‘Three Forces’ in Accordance With the Law,” China News Agency, 15 August 08 (Open Source Center, 15 August 08).

¹²²The government describes religious extremism as one of the “three forces” against which it has launched a “strike-hard” campaign. The other forces are separatism and terrorism. Local government reported maintaining surveillance of religious practice through a “two-point system,” which has been in force in recent years and is described by local government sources as a mechanism for maintaining regular contact with mosques and carrying out “chats” with religious figures. For a basic description of the two-point system, see Aqsu Party Building (Online), “32nd Installment” [Di 32 qi], 18 January 05; Onsu Party Building, “United Front Embraces the 2 Systems, Perfects the 3 Kinds of Mechanisms” [Tongzhanbu weirao liang xiang zhidu gaishan sanzong jizhi], 5 April 06. For reports from the past year on the two-point system and other measures to control religious practice in the region, including via increased controls over mosques and religious leaders, see, e.g., Kashgar District Government (Online), “Yengisar County Speech on Its Current Stance” [Yingishaxian biaotai fayan], 5 January 08; Qumul District Government (Online), “Gülshat Abduhadir Stresses at District Education Work Meeting, Enlarge Investments for Optimal Environment” [Gulixiati Abudouhade’er zai diqu jiaoyu gongzuo huiyishang qiangdiao jiada touru youhua huanjing], 9 March 08; Yeken [Yarkand] County Government (Online), “Yeken County Almaty Village Implements ‘8 Acts’ To Establish Safe and Sound Village” [Shachexian alamaitixiang shishi “baxiang jucuo” chuanguan pingan xiangzhen], 16 October 07; Kashgar District Government (Online), “Let Society Be Stable and Harmonious, For the People To Be Without Fear—Work Report on Poskam County Striving to Establish a Region-Level Quiet and Stable County” [Rang shehui wending hexie wei baixing anjuleye—zepuxian zheng chuang zizhiqiji ping’an xian gongzuo jishi], 3 December 07; “Crackdown on Xinjiang Mosques, Religion,” Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 August 08; “Mongghulküre County ‘Protect Olympics, Protect Stability’ Supervision Group Reports Work to Ili Prefecture” [Zhaosuxian shang yili zhou “bao ao yun cu wending” dudao xiaozu huibao gongzuo], Ili Peace Net (Online), 16 July 08; Mongghulküre County Promptly Arranges Implementation of Spirit of Ili 7.13 Stability Meeting [Zhaosuxian xunsu anpai luoshi yilizhou “7.13” wending huiyi jingshen], Ili Peace Net (Online), 16 July 08; Kashgar District Government, “Usher in the Olympics and Ensure Stability; Jiashi People Are of One Heart and Mind,” 8 August 08 (Open Source Center, 8 August 08).

¹²³“Nur Bekri’s Speech at Autonomous Region Cadre Plenary Session” [Nu’er Baikeli zai zizhiqu ganbu dahui shang de jianghua], Tianshan Net (Online), 11 September 08.

¹²⁴“Uyghur Mosque Demolished,” Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 June 08; Jüme, “Mosque in Kelpin County Destroyed by the Government” [Kelpin nahiyisi tewesidiki bir meschit hökümet teripidin cheqiwetildi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 June 08. In response to a question about the demolition, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson described the mosque as part of two “unlawfully built structures” used “without authorization” for religious activity and said that local residents tore down the structures on their own after learning their construction violated Chinese law. Lin Liping and Rong Yan, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Says the Report Alleging the ‘Demolition of a Mosque in Xinjiang’ Grossly Untrue,” Xinhua, 8 July 08 (Open Source Center, 8 July 08). See also “AFP Reporters Barred From China Village Where Mosque Was Razed,” Agence France-Presse, 30 July 08 (Open Source Center, 30 July 08).

¹²⁵For examples of reported measures, see, e.g., “Religious Repression in Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 3; Shayar County Government (Online), “Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen Management During Ramadan” [Shayaxian yingmaili zhen caiqu

jiu xiang cuoshijiaqiang “zhaiyue” qijian guanli], 28 August 08; “Five Measures from Mongghulküre County Ensure Ramadan Management and Olympics Security” [Zhaosuxian wu cuoshi tiqian zuohao zhaiyue guanli bao ao yun wending], Fazhi Xinjiang (Online), 23 August 08; “Toqsu County Deploys Work to Safeguard Stability During Ramadan” [Xinhexian bushu zhaiyue qijian weiwen gongzuo], Xinjiang Peace Net (Online), 2 September 08; Yopurgha County Government (Online), “Our County Carries Out Plans for Work on Management of Religious Affairs During Ramadan” [Wo qu dui zhaiyue qijian zongjiao shiwu guanli gongzuo jinxing anpail], 1 September 08; Küytun City Government (Online), “Küytun City Convenes Meeting on Work to Safeguard Stability, Carries Out Plans on Safety Work During Paralympics, Ramadan, and National Day” [Kuitunshi zhaokai wei wen gongzuo huiyi dui can’aohui, zhaiyue he guoqingjie qijian anquan gongzuo jinxing anpail], 3 September 08; “Ramadan Curbs on China’s Muslims,” Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 September 08.

¹²⁶ “Xinjiang Uyghurs Committed to Ramadan Are Detained, Retired Han Official Criticizes Corruption” [Xinjiang weizuren jianchi fengzhai beiju hanren tuixiu guan pi zhengfu tanful], Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 September 08.

¹²⁷ See generally Shayar County Government, “Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen Management During Ramadan”; “Five Measures from Mongghulküre County Ensure Ramadan Management and Olympics Security,” Fazhi Xinjiang; “Toqsu County Deploys Work to Safeguard Stability During Ramadan,” Xinjiang Peace Net; Yopurgha County Government, “Our County Carries Out Plans for Work on Management of Religious Affairs During Ramadan”; Küytun City Government, “Küytun City Convenes Meeting on Work to Safeguard Stability, Carries Out Plans on Safety Work During Paralympics, Ramadan, and National Day”; “Ramadan Curbs on China’s Muslims,” Radio Free Asia.

¹²⁸ Shayar County Government, “Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen Management During Ramadan”; “Five Measures from Mongghulküre County Ensure Ramadan Management and Olympics Security,” Fazhi Xinjiang; “Ramadan Curbs on China’s Muslims,” Radio Free Asia; Wel, “Chinese Government Now Forcing Women in Xoten to Expose Their Faces” [Xitay hökümiti hazir xotende ayallarni yüzini échiwétishqa mejburlimaqta], Radio Free Asia (Online), 27 August 08.

¹²⁹ “Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain Protesters,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 3.

¹³⁰ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures of the Law on the Protection of Minors [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu shishi “Weichengnianren baohufa” banfa], issued 25 September 93, art. 14. No other provincial or national regulation on minors or on religion contains this precise provision. Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China (Online), “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” April 2005, 58 (pagination follows “text-only” pdf download of this report).

¹³¹ Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), “A Life or Death Struggle in East Turkestan; Uyghurs Face Unprecedented Persecution in post-Olympic Period,” 4 September 08, 4.

¹³² See, e.g., Shayar County Government, “Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen Management During Ramadan”; Yopurgha County Government, “Our County Carries Out Plans for Work on Management of Religious Affairs During Ramadan”; Küytun City Government, “Küytun City Convenes Meeting on Work to Safeguard Stability, Carries Out Plans on Safety Work During Paralympics, Ramadan, and National Day”; Kashgar District Government (Online), “Maralbeshi Launches Activities for Developing and Cultivating National Spirit in Elementary and Secondary Schools Month” [Bachu kaizhan zhongxiaoxue hongyang he peiyu minzu jingshen yue huodong], 26 September 08; “Qorghas County Langan Village ‘Attaches Importance, Propagates, Arranges, Examines, Protects, Strikes, and Prevents’ to Do Various Work Regarding Muslim Population During Ramadan” [Huochengxian langan xiang “zhong, xuan, pai, cha, bao, yan, fang” zuo hao musilin qunzhong zhaiyue qijian ge xiang gongzuo], Qorghas Peace Net (Online), 27 August 08; “Religious Repression in Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 3; “Ramadan Curbs on China’s Muslims,” Radio Free Asia.

¹³³ See, e.g., “Xinjiang Government Continues Restrictions on Mosque Attendance,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 8; U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2008, China.

¹³⁴ See, e.g., Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government (Online), “Nur Bekri’s Work Report at First Session of the 11th Xinjiang Autonomous Regional People’s Congress” [Zai zizhiqu shiyi jie renda yi ci huiyi shang nu’er baikeli suo zuo zhengfu gongzuo bao], 16 January 08; Yeken County Government, “Yeken County Almaty Village Implements ‘8 Acts’ To Establish Safe and Sound Village.” For information on the 2007 passport restrictions, see the CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 99.

¹³⁵ U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2008, China.

¹³⁶ “China Jails Clerics for Planning Mecca Trips, Group Says,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), reprinted in Taipei Times (Online), 25 June 08. According to the DPA article, authorities also reportedly punished the group for distributing copies of the Quran at a criminal sentencing rally.

¹³⁷ For more information on recent controls, see CECC 2007 Annual Report, 99.

¹³⁸ “Record Number of Chinese Muslims To Make Mecca Pilgrimage,” Xinhua, 14 November 07 (Open Source Center, 14 November 07).

¹³⁹ Islamic Association of China, ed., Practical Pilgrimage Handbook for Chinese Muslims [Zhongguo musilin chaojin shiyong shouce], (Ningxia People’s Publishing Company), 121.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 106–107.

¹⁴¹For more information on recent controls imposed on Muslim communities across China, see CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 89–91, and CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 98–100.

¹⁴²Wen Ping, “How Was the Problem Between Religion and Socialism Cracked—Exclusive Interview With Religious Affairs Administration Director Ye Xiaowen.”

¹⁴³United Front Work Department (Online), “Ningxia’s ‘2008 First-Term Study Class for Muslim Personnel’ Opens” [Ningxia “2008 nian di yi qi yisilanjiao jiaozhi ren yuan dushuban” kaixue], 14 March 08.

